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Abstract
The article reports on a study of 11 schools that were labeled as
low-performing by the state accountability systems of Maryland and
Kentucky, nationally known for complex performance-based 
assessments. The study shows that putting schools on probation only
weakly motivated teachers because the assessments were largely
perceived as unfair, invalid, and unrealistic. Administrators responded
with control strategies that rigidified organizations, forestalling dialog
and learning processes. Instructional reform developed only feebly. On
the other hand, some schools remedied inefficiencies and were able to
"harvest the low-hanging fruit." The schools struggled with severe
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problems of teacher commitment.
The proliferation of high-stakes accountability systems in the United States has fast 
created a new category of schools identified with various labels: Schools on Probation,
Schools under Reconstitution, Schools in Decline or in Crisis, Schools under Review,
Immediate Intervention Schools, Schools Eligible for Assistance, and so on. Each
accountability system has created its own nomenclature, but the underlying structure is
the same: Based on a small set of numerical performance indicators, accountability
systems identify putative underperformers that are given a limited period of time to
reverse growth deficits or decline and that are threatened with more severe penalties
upon failure to do so. In the public debate, these schools are also known summarily as
"failing."
As of the year 2001, 27 states have had school accountability systems that identify
low-performing schools and 14 states stipulate more severe penalties when an 
underperforming school fails to improve (Boser, 2001). In 1997 the city of Chicago
alone identified a hundred or so public schools on probation that managed to have fewer
than fifteen percent of their students read at the national norm, as measured by the Iowa
Test of Basic Skills (Chicago Public Schools, 1997). To date, the small state of
Maryland has identified 200 or so schools statewide. Between 1999 and 2001 alone, the
large state of California identified 1290 persistently low-performing schools that are
enrolled in the state's "Immediate Intervention/ Underperforming Schools Program."
Implementation of the new federal Title I legislation may add further impetus to the
phenomenon. What is more, these schools are not randomly or evenly distributed across 
the states, but in many instances are clustered in districts that traditionally serve poor
and disadvantaged minority populations. For example, in Maryland, almost all identified
schools are located in two districts; in California, 54 of the 1000 or so school districts
with more than 10 schools have at least a third of their schools eligible for California's
Immediate Intervention/ Underperforming Schools Program.
Leaving aside the possibility of a mere symbolic purpose of "high stakes," these policies
bank on the motivational power of sanctions, currently conceptualized in two ways. In 
one version, popular among economists, high-stakes accountability is resource-neutral;
that is, improvements occur as a result of changed orientations and dispositions towards
work effort (Hanushek, 1994). In another version, strongly advocated by researchers
around the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE), sanctions, such as
probation or reconstitution, attain their motivational power in conjunction with resources
needed for capacity building in schools that fail as much for lack of will as for
insufficient capacity (Fuhrman & Elmore, 2001; O'Day, Goertz, & Floden, 1995; O'Day
& Smith, 1993). Thus, in the first version, clear performance goals, incentives, and
sanctions make new resources unnecessary while in the second version they make new
resources more effective. But in either case, the motivational power of incentives and
sanctions on individuals or organizations is assumed or implied. In fact, we could 
probably dispense with the whole superstructure of "high stakes" that many states have
built up in the last few years and return to more traditional redistributive grant making
patterns (Peterson, Rabe, & Wong, 1991) if it was not for the belief in the power of
incentives and sanctions for the improvement of low-performing or "failing" schools.
The power of incentives and sanctions is even more crucial in systems that place the
accountability burden on schools rather than districts. In such systems, incentives and
sanctions must compensate for the states' limited capacity to directly regulate or
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administrate remote school actors.
"Naming and shaming," as the English say, threatening more severe penalties, signaling
public urgency and support are major mechanisms of probation that are to impel 
individual educators and schools to improve. Generally speaking, while there is some
research on the effect of high stakes accountability on schools generally (Firestone,
Mayrowetz, & Fairman, 1998; Kelley, 1999; Kelley, Conley, & Kimball, 2000; Kelley &
Protsik, 1997; Newmann, King, & Rigdon, 1997; Fuhrman & Odden, 2001), little
research on the role of sanctions in low-performing schools is available (Hess, 1999;
Hess, 2000; Ofsted, 1997; Reynolds, 1996; Wong, Anagnostopoulos, Rutledge, Lynn, &
Dreeben, 1999; Wong, Anagnostopoulos, & Rutledge, 1998), despite the proliferation of
the phenomenon. But the absence of research does not necessarily mean that "little or
nothing is established," (Wilcox & Gray, 1996, p.3) or as researchers have it, that
nothing "is known." While certainly holding little appeal to the education profession that
is subjected to it, probation and sanctions must make intuitive sense for those that decree
and design accountability systems. This article, trying to get behind these intuitions,
reports on findings from a three-year study of schools on probation in the states of
Maryland and Kentucky. The study investigated the effect of probation on individual
performance motivation, organizational processes, and patterns of instruction. The 
primary purpose of this article is to provide a summary of findings in abbreviated form.
(Note 1) 
The Two States
High-stakes accountability has been a topic of vigorous debate and discussion among 
educators and educational researchers in recent years. Particularly the Texas case has
found wide attention (McNeil, 2000; Sklar, Scheurich, & Johnson, 2000). The states of
Maryland and Kentucky, by contrast, garnered national acclaim (Quality Counts 2001,
2001) for centering their accountability systems on tests that went beyond basic literacy
and numeracy by asking students to perform complex learning, experiments, cooperative
projects, complex essays, and portfolios. Although both states have by now abandoned
the complex tests with which they started out, our data were collected at a time when
they were still in use, though as in the case of Kentucky already contested. Thus, this
study informs on schools' responses to probation in pedagogically complex
accountability systems.
Naturally, there is more to an accountability system than student learning assessments.
There are non-academic performance indicators (in the case of the two states mainly 
attendance for elementary and middle schools), there are rewards and sanctions,
selection criteria for low-performing schools, exit criteria for probation, school
governance requirements, planning mandates, monitoring systems, and supports for
building capacity at schools. These characteristics are embedded in authority
relationships between schools, districts and the state. And all of these elements are in
constant flux as political coalitions shift and new plans are advanced by state policy
makers (Cibulka & Lindle, 2001), making accountability systems truly moving targets of
study.
At the time the study was conducted between 1997 and 2000, both states had the main
features of elaborate accountability systems in common: complex student assessments,
performance categories for schools, rewards and sanctions as well as school 
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improvement planning and monitoring. But within this basic structure they differed in
some respects. Compared to Maryland, the Kentucky reform was more comprehensive,
more rule-bound and scripted, but also more contested and in transition (Pankratz &
Petrosko, 2000). The Maryland accountability system with the MSPAP (Maryland
School Performance Assessment Program) as its heart piece was more radical in its
performance demands and also more consensual at the time.
Kentucky schools on probation, or in the state's language at the time "schools in 
decline," were identified through a straightforward formula calculated on the basis of
quantitative growth expectations, and they exited the status when they met expected test
score gains. Schools on all levels of absolute performance could be in decline when they
did not meet their targets. Schools could attain modest, but not trivial monetary rewards
for raising test scores. The state dispatched to schools "in decline" a trained change agent
(called Distinguished or Highly Skilled Educator/ HSE) who provided know-how on the
system's requirements and mechanisms as well as general skills in school improvement
(David, Kannapel, & McDiarmid., 2000). Accountability brought to Kentucky schools
more managerial autonomy from districts and a new school-internal governance
structure of shared decision making and parental involvement. At the same time, the
state gradually increased the prescriptiveness of the state curriculum. Towards the end of 
the study, the format of the central test became more traditional and sanctions lost some
of their rigor, having never been fully applied anyway. The reconfiguration of the system
wiped schools' slates clean again.
By contrast, Maryland left wide discretion to the state department of education in
selecting "reconstitution-eligible schools" (the state's term for probation), imposing 
sanctions, and exiting schools from probation. The state department tended to select rock
bottom performers for probation, applied final sanctions very sparingly, and set exit
criteria (performance at state average) very high. State rewards and supports played a
lesser role in the system. During the study period, reconstitution was a tool of the state to
influence the reform disposition of two large districts that were expected to provide local
resources and support to failing schools in order to avert the threat of state take-over of
schools. Thus, the state exerted indirect pressure on districts to take the test seriously,
but beyond that it generally provided little pedagogical guidance and capacity building.
Probation evolved into a situation in which some 200 hundred schools have been
languishing for years.
The Study
Findings are based on case studies of eleven schools on probation in the two states. Each
case study set consists of quantitative and qualitative data: interviews, classroom 
observations, meeting observations, and survey questionnaires. To gain a better
understanding of the behavior of a larger number of schools on probation, we also
analyzed school improvement plans from 46 schools in Maryland and 32 from Kentucky
as well as state test score data from Maryland. (We did not conduct such analysis for
Kentucky due to the change of test formats during our study). Data collection took place
between the spring of 1998 and the spring of 2000. The study investigates the role of
probation in schools that serve student populations with high proportions of children
from poverty and minority backgrounds. Thus, all eleven schools have high proportions
of students in the Free or Reduced Lunch program. In the Maryland schools, more than
90 percent of the students are from an ethnic minority background. In the Kentucky 
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schools, minority proportions are above the state average.
The seven Maryland and four Kentucky schools were selected according to district,
school type, duration in the program, educational load, and performance history. In each 
state, about half of the selected schools are middle schools, half are elementary schools.
In Maryland, the schools are in the two districts where almost all schools on probation
are located. In Kentucky the schools reflect the state's geographic diversity. Four
schools, two in each state, are probation veterans while seven schools had been
identified half a year prior to data collection. We did not select schools based on their
previous performance. Rather, we wanted to study the unfolding of probation, not
knowing whether the schools would be successful in their improvement effort. As a
result, this is not a design that allows us to evaluate the programs in the two states.
Each school was visited numerous times by at least two researchers over a two-year
period from 1998 to 2000. The database for each Maryland case typically consists of a 
survey, a minimum of twenty-one formal, semi-structured interviews, and many more
informal ones as well as six classroom observations per school. Interviewees were
teachers of all subjects, administrators, instructional specialists, and other resource
teachers. All principals were interviewed. We also interviewed district officials who
were responsible for programs in schools on probation, as well as state officials, state
monitors, and district support personnel. At least four meetings at each school were
formally observed. In many cases the researchers participated in a number of additional
meetings. In the Kentucky schools we interviewed slightly fewer numbers of teachers
and observed fewer classrooms. Interviews were conducted with the help of
standardizing protocols and transcribed and coded with the help of NUDIST. To better
understand instructional patterns we analyze data from 45 (30 MD, 15 KY) classroom 
visits, consisting of a lesson observation and subsequent debriefing interview.
The teacher questionnaire, containing 250 items, was administered to all full time
teachers at the eleven schools. Findings from the survey data stand together with 
qualitative data from interviews, meetings, and classroom observations. Overall
response rate to the survey was 53 percent, though response rates varied by school.
Across the two states and eleven schools, a total of 287 respondents returned valid
questionnaires. An analysis of respondents' characteristics show that teachers with
leadership roles in their schools are over-represented in the sample. However, the 200 or
so interviews that were conducted with teachers from more varied backgrounds largely
confirm the quantitative patterns. These interview data do not contain the bias towards
teachers in leadership position.
Individual Work Motivation
Intuitions
Although I have never seen it explicitly spelled out by policy makers and designers of
accountability systems why probation and the threat of sanctions would be effective 
motivators in educational settings, one could imagine the following intuitive scenario:
When a school is publicly labeled as deficient, teachers after going through a whole
range of emotions accept the urgency of improvement. This urgency is reinforced by the
discomfort caused by state audits and the like. Teachers and administrators want to
repair their public image, but they also take responsibility for the quality of their work.
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So, they take a critical look at their own work and reflect on the valid performance
demands of the accountability system. They finally decide to increase effort in their own
classroom and get involved in the improvement of their school. Teachers who are highly
committed to their school are especially motivated. Additional support that might
accompany probation is appreciated and put to good use, but fresh resources are not
essential for increasing one's effort in the classroom.
Theories
In the literature, work motivation in accountability systems is often conceptualized in
relationship to sense of efficacy, control, goal setting, and expectancy of rewards. These
varied, though related sources of motivation are assumed to increase teachers' 
performance if teachers believe that the task is in their control and they have the
requisite competence for its execution, if they see a connection between individual effort
and expected reward and if they value the reward itself. Teachers strive for goals that are
clear, specific, worthwhile, and attainable (Kelley & Protsik, 1997), and accountability
systems streamline the work situation in this regard. Shamir, on the other hand, doubts
the applicability of "point of action" theories of motivation, as he calls them. These
models of motivation are useful in predicting discrete task behavior, but they are less
powerful in explaining a "diffuse and open-ended concept of commitment" (Shamir,
1991, p. 408) that refers to a "shifting number and range of rather ill-delineated
performances rather than to ironclad and numerically constant behaviors having clearly
defined parameters that everyone knows" (ibid.).
In Shamir's view, expectancy and goal setting models of motivation presuppose "strong
situations," i.e. situations structured by clear and specific goals, reward expectancies, 
and clearly identifiable relationships between increased effort, performance, and reward.
Schools, however, are "weak" performance situations in which moral purpose and
internalized standards are primary motivators. If he is right, then the accountability
system would become motivating to the degree that it reinforces educational goals
valued by teachers. But imbued in probation is not only an incentive to improve and
attain rewards, either for the sake of the children or one's own professional prestige, but
also an element of coercion and a threat of further penalties to which minimum
compliance or exit might be the answer (Katz, 1970; Porter, Lawler, & Hackman, 1975;
Vroom, 1964). While the research has not found a clear relationship between job
satisfaction and work motivation, job satisfaction is related to job commitment, i.e. one's
willingness to show up for work or stay on the job (Lawler, 1973; Mohrman, Mohrman, 
& Odden, 1996). According to Shamir, more congruence between work motivation and
commitment may be expected if accountability systems tap into teachers' more 
deep-seated values, ideals, and performance standards.
Findings
Awareness. Probation had the attention of the majority of educators at the eleven 
schools, but especially in the long-term probationary schools knowledge of what the
status entailed became sketchy. When the school's status was first announced in public,
many teachers felt "very demoralized," "really down" or "mortified." Senior teachers
who described themselves as hard-working were shocked: "I took it very personally,
because of the efforts that I've made in the years that I've been here... It was almost like,
I had broken an arm, and I was in a lot of pain that particular day" (A-19; eighth grade
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science teacher). But soon thereafter, personal distancing ensued and personal
culpability was rejected: "I viewed it as a very negative cast over the school and over
me, because I thought it was basically speaking about my instructional leadership. But
then on reflection, I realized that it wasn't about me. ....So, once I....cleared my head of 
any guilt feelings, then I was able to move forward" (E-7; elementary school principal).
Mild pressure. For most interviewees, the imposition of final sanctions was
inconceivable and they were not worried about their jobs. Instead, many stressed their
professional worth in spite of public perceptions. On the survey, we asked teachers to 
rate themselves as professionals. Overwhelming majorities said they were adequately or
very well prepared (90 percent), highly skilled (60 to 70 percent), and very willing to
exert effort (about 70 percent), despite the fact that large numbers of teachers
particularly in the Maryland schools were fairly new to the profession (46 percent five
years or less) and the school (71 percent five years or less). On the other hand, our
sample is biased towards activist teachers that fulfill some leadership functions at their
schools (43 percent of sample). In the interviews, teachers with or without leadership
positions voiced confidence and contended that they did the best they could under the
difficult circumstances, such as this elementary school teacher in one of the first
Maryland schools on probation: " Basically, if you think you can do it better, come in, 
step in, and feel free to show us how to do it any better than how we've been trying to do
it.... They [the state] lay these threats on the table, 'We're gonna come take you over.'...
And you just get to the point where you say....'Fine, fire me!'"
Most teachers perceived probation as mild pressure and did not worry about threats.
Instead, for them probation signaled the need for support, and they were willing to 
endure the stigma in return for new resources: "The stigma is the minus, but the
programs that come about from that is a plus. You know, it's kind of two-sided.... I
think, you know, the programs that would come about because of it, you know, it
outweighs the negative. I think it's good, but I think that they should get rid of the bad
stigma that goes with it" (B-5). For most interviewees, probation was not occasion for
self-searching. Rather it was a nuisance and stood as well for vague hopes for support.
We inquired in both survey and interviews about the accountability system in general.
After all, it is this system that spells out the rules for rewards and punishments. We
operationalized the theoretical models by asking how teachers perceived the importance,
validity, fairness, realism, and directiveness of the system. (Note 2) Roughly speaking, 
the goals of the accountability system are of medium to high importance for respondents.
When asked in the interviews what makes attaining high test scores important, most
teachers responded that it was "a prestige thing." They didn't like "being at a school
where every day in the article they say we're failures" (20-09; Kentucky middle school
English), and "all the county sees is the test scores" (B-12, Maryland middle school
Health). Fewer interviewees also saw the tests as a useful gauge of performance and
some of them, particularly administrators, said they evaluated their success based on the
scores, but for many more, the importance of the system's performance goals was
connected to their concerns for diminished professional status.
Fairness. The accountability system was less connected to the quality of teaching and
learning because large majorities of respondents doubted the system's fairness and 
validity as a gauge of good teaching. The system was seen as unfair because it did not
reflect that "honestly......it's not the teaching as much as it is the children" (10-14; first
grade), and "we are doing our part, ..... really, the biggest part is missing for a lot of
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them, that's the home" (A-11; seventh grade). Many teachers rejected the burden that
accountability systems singularly placed on them and called for more distributed
responsibility for student achievement: "The adage that it takes a village to raise a child
is true, you know, and what that accountability thing says to me is you only hold a few
villagers, instead of the entire village for the accountability" (E-8, Maryland elementary
school).
Validity. Only about a quarter of the survey respondents agreed that the state 
assessments validly reflected "good teaching." Whereas accountability systems are
designed around standardized outcomes, teachers in the eleven schools were avowedly
child-centered in their philosophy. Survey and interview responses were similar in this
regard. "The state, I really, the test, I could care less about, to be honest with you" (B-7).
For them, "just getting these kids to do their best and be able to write and to answer
questions [was their] ...key priority" (B-7). In this vein, 71 percent of respondents
asserted in the survey that "rather than expecting a great improvement in school
performance test scores, [they] concentrate on individual students' growth, no matter
how small." When asked to rank-order a catalog of 11 quality indicators for their work,
respondents gave standardized tests ranks 7 to 9. Teachers drew their sense of success
primarily from direct interaction with students, comments from parents, and
teacher-made tests. Teaching "life lessons," basic skills, citizenship, and social conduct, 
in the eyes of interviewees essential for their clientele, were not captured by the test, but
took center stage in their classrooms. Therefore "looking at the kids' background, and
looking at what is written in that test and how it addresses them and the social issues that
they have, they may not make that connection. So, they may not do well. But what is
important to me is if my kids are learning the things that I'm teaching them, somehow
they're able to connect it to the things that they're doing" (A-8; eighth grade social
studies).
Thus, personalization prevailed over data-drivenness, incrementalism over the ambition
of vast test-score gains, and basic skills orientation over performance-based pedagogy. 
Teachers' internal performance standards were not congruent with the external standards
of the accountability agency. Many teachers' self-concept eschewed the image of the
score maximizer in favor of the image of an educator beholden to the intellectual and
social growth of individual students and committed to the needs of the local community.
Likewise, rewards were derived from encounters with individual students or learning
groups and from psychic satisfaction:
I don't feel like I need to know that they think that I'm doing the best at this 
and they're going to reward me for this or whatever. That's just not really
important to me. I like to see my students succeed and I like to think that
yes, I had something to do with that. Really, that's the only reason why we're
here. The other people aren't that important. It's our students that we help
make some achievements. (Kentucky middle school, 40-04; sixth grade 
reading)
Realism and directiveness. While many teachers expected their schools to improve in the
near future, optimism was much more muted when teachers rated their chances to 
improve according to the criteria of the accountability system. For example, on the
survey 50 percent of Kentucky respondents found the system's performance goals "very
unrealistic." Yet, the directiveness of the system was very high, and large majorities
among survey respondents and interviewees professed to act according to the system's
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directions and demands. With grave doubts about the system's meaningfulness (with
regard to validity, fairness, and realism), teachers said to be primarily moved out of
compliance with the state and out of concern for professional prestige. Thus, in an
Analysis of Variance that tested relationships between three levels of engagement in
school improvement and means in the importance, validity, fairness, realism, and
directiveness scales, only goal importance and directiveness show strong and significant
differences in means. For work effort, a similar analysis shows moderate, but significant
differences in means for directiveness, but not goal importance. Interestingly, the
(reportedly) more industrious teachers were even more skeptical about the 
meaningfulness of the system. I conclude from these findings that the accountability
system was overall a poor motivator for teachers in the eleven schools on probation, and
its strongest motivators were authoritativeness and stigma producing compliance and
status anxiety. Survey responses and interviews concur in this respect.
Job Commitment. While authoritativeness and stigma may have pushed people to 
become more involved and increase work effort, the highly motivated were not
necessarily more committed to staying at their school (means on the commitment scale
do not differ according to levels of engagement and effort). On many occasions, we were
struck when apparent leaders in school improvement disclosed to us in the interviews
that they were planning to leave. Besides better career options elsewhere, these teachers
often bemoaned intolerable pressures they felt obligated to respond to at their school.
But when teachers believed more strongly in the meaningfulness of the accountability
system, their job commitment was significantly higher. That is, more committed teacher
groups had significantly higher mean ratings on the system's fairness and realism, (but
not validity). Among the various factors tested, the factor showing the strongest mean
difference for job commitment was "expectation of improvement." Thus, more
committed teachers were also more optimistic about their school's prospect. According 
to the interviews, optimism was an article of faith for some, others reasoned that as a
result of probation their school would receive more attention and new resources, but
almost nobody mentioned changes in their own classrooms. Improvements were mostly
understood as improvement of others or the organization as a whole.
Overall, the eleven schools, particularly the seven Maryland schools, were beset with
problems of teacher turn-over. About half of the respondents, again with teachers in 
leadership positions over-represented, were not certain about staying or were certain to
leave. In fact, in many of the Maryland schools the teacher turn-over rate was about 50%
from year to year. For those that planned to stay, relationships at school but also the
challenge of school improvement and an optimistic outlook were drawing points, but
fewer respondents named probation as a positive influence on the school. Primary
reasons for Maryland teachers planning to leave were better career options elsewhere
and the feeling that their school was "a sinking ship." In the four Kentucky schools,
fatigue from the pressures of probation was the most important reason to leave. Given
different job market conditions in the two states, it is conceivable that for the Maryland
leavers exit options tempered the pressures of probation; lack of such options may have
heightened these pressures for the Kentucky leavers. But it should be stressed that
probation for respondents in the eleven schools resulted in mild pressure only, and given 
the sentiments uncovered here, an increase in pressure advocated by some policy makers
frustrated with the presumed lack of effect of probation may exacerbate an already
severe commitment problem in these schools.
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Summary. The study found that probation under the circumstances of the eleven schools
may have a weak influence on individual work motivation and an overall negative effect 
on teachers' job commitment. Probation in the eleven schools primarily evokes an
urgency for improvements through a dynamic of compliance and concern for
professional prestige. Pressures are mild, but tangible for the more obligated teachers.
Although both the Maryland and Kentucky assessments are complex, they lack
meaningfulness for the great majority of educators participating in the study. Teachers
eschew the spirit of reward calculus, and hold against the standardized verdict of failure
a philosophy of personal connection to children, psychic rewards, and incrementalism.
As a result, the impetus of the system for self-examination and reevaluation of one's
personal educational responsibility is weak. The mildness of pressure and the promise of
new resources seem to temper potentially harmful effects of probation on job 
commitment, but at the same time commitment is a serious problem for the eleven
schools that seems to be exacerbated by probation. With turn-over rates of 30 to 50
percent per year, and highly motivated teacher leaders leaving as likely as lesser
motivated teachers, one cannot argue that with probation the "right people are leaving."
Organizational Development
Intuitions
Most accountability systems hold whole schools, rather than individuals accountable for
higher performance, and it is therefore through school-wide improvement that 
individuals overcome the label of probation. How could probation work in this way?
The label of probation throws the school in crisis, but at the same time makes people
realize that "we are in this together." Intense dialog, perhaps even conflict around the
discrepancy between the current situation of the school and the state's performance
demands ensue. Eventually the faculty pulls together around a set of shared expectations
that are the basis for a formal structure of internal accountability. Performance data bring
shortcomings into focus. All parts of the school are evaluated; planning and more
vigilant monitoring make the school more effective; and with determined leadership the
school learns new strategies to turn itself around and change instruction.
Theories
Deliberately induced crisis and group accountability are the main motivational levers
imbued in probation, but these levers often come together with programmatic and 
managerial mandates and supports for capacity building. This mix is to shape the
organization's social interactions and improvement strategies. Organizational theorists
have recognized the work group as an important source of work satisfaction,
commitment, and productivity (Tannenbaum, 1970; Katz, 1970; Mohrman, Mohrman &
Odden, 1996). In the field of education, studies by Rosenholtz, (1991) and Little &
McLaughlin (1993) have shown that teachers increase their commitment to, and
involvement in, reform when collegial relationships at school are strong, supportive, and
innovative.
Very little is known about how group accountability might work in the context of 
schools (Hanushek, 1994; Malen, 1999). Effective schools research considers the school
the most suitable strategic unit for educational improvement. Some authors believe that
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group accountability may be a way "to motivate teachers and administrators to enact
their jobs in a manner that leads to significantly higher student achievement, sometimes 
without a commensurate increase in expenditures [emphasis added]" (Mohrman, 
Mohrman & Odden, 1996, p. 54). But once the attainment of rewards or the aversion of
penalties is tied to the group, rewards and sanctions operate in "weaker" situations, in
Shamir's terminology, as the individual reward expectations are dependent on
colleagues' capacity and willingness. As a result, group-generated performance
motivation must tap into teachers' more broad-based and diffuse commitment to the
organization. Moreover, in the literature on high performance organizations the group is
usually understood as the basis for rewards or bonuses rather than as the unit that may
have to absorb sanctions and penalties. The response of work units to sanctions may 
flow from individual and organizational processes that are quite different from those at
work in high-performance or high-involvement organizations. Responses to sanctions
may be more adequately captured by a line of inquiry that places the failing organization
and its crisis in the center.
Induced crisis, as a means to rouse a declining organization to focus on its essential
service (Meyer & Zucker, 1989) can motivate an organization to learn (Leithwood & 
Seashore Louis, 1998). As probation throws schools into crisis, they unfreeze. Old
routines and mental models are up for internal debate and conflict may arise. A
conflict-driven scenario of organizational learning is narrated by Bennett & Ferlie
(1994): "A crisis moves awkward issues up agendas...We are likely to see continuing
pressure from pioneers, the formation of special groups that seek to evangelize the rest
of the organization, high energy and commitment levels and a period of organizational
plasticity" (p.11). In schools on probation, the initiative should move to high-performing
and highly motivated, perhaps even maverick, groups of teachers and administrators. At
minimum, this process entails dialog about the goals of the accountability system, a
collective commitment to shared expectations, and formal structures that undergird
internal accountability (Abelmann, Elmore, Even, Kenyon, & Marshall, 1999).
External threat and induced crisis, however, are not automatic triggers of learning 
(Levine, Rubin, & Wolohojian, 1981). According to Staw's threat-rigidity model (Staw,
Lance, & Dutton, 1981), two organizational responses to threat are likely. If the group
believes in the likelihood of success in meeting the new demand from the environment,
increased cohesiveness, support for leadership, but also a tendency to uniformity and
centralized control occurs. If the group believes in the likelihood of failure, constricted
interaction gives way to leadership instability and dissension. But even organizations
successfully responding to new stressful external demands tend to reinforce dominant
patterns of operation, rather than learn new things, according to this model.
Findings
Our data confirm the motivational power of the group for work effort and engagement in
school improvement activities. We composed from survey items several internally 
reliable scales that captured respondents' perceptions of their faculty: skills of 
colleagues, collegiality, principal control, principal support, and burden sharing (three 
items that specifically ask about group control and sharing the work load).[3] Across the
eleven schools, respondents with reported higher levels of engagement and effort also
perceived their faculties to be significantly more collegial and their principal strong, i.e.
both more controlling and supportive. This contrasts with the relative irrelevance of the
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accountability system's meaningfulness for different levels of work motivation across the
eleven schools.
A comparison between two "moving" and two "stuck" schools from Maryland
(Rosenholtz, 1991) corroborates this pattern. In the two moving schools, levels of
engagement and work effort as well as school-wide activity levels (identified by field
work) were higher; incidentally the moving schools also managed to increase their
scores on the key state assessment (MSPAP) during the study period, whereas the two
stuck schools either stagnated or declined. In the two moving schools, perceptions of
colleagues' skills, collegial relationships, and principal support were significantly more
positive than in the stuck schools. (Principal control and burden-sharing were
insignificant). By contrast, the meaningfulness of the accountability system was actually
more in doubt in the two moving schools. Yet, respondents in the moving schools felt
more directed by the system and attached more importance to overcoming probation and
raising test scores, that is, they responded more strongly to the extrinsic motivators of
the system. Thus, probation made the moving schools more moving due to higher
internal organizational capacity and external pressure, i.e. stigma and authoritativeness,
but not because they believed in the rightfulness of the system. But it was troubling that 
teachers in the moving schools were not significantly more committed to staying.
What was going on in the two moving schools? Patterns of organizational interaction
and types of improvement strategies were in many respects quite similar in the two 
schools, one an elementary school, the other a middle schools. Both were located in the
same district which had few of its schools on probation, organized a fairly efficient
central Office of School Improvement, and awarded to all its "reconstitution-eligible"
(RE) schools between $150,000 and $250,000 in excess of the regular budget.
Both schools were led by seasoned principals who had survived in their position, but felt
nevertheless under enormous pressure. (Note 3) With teachers feeling probation only as
mild pressure, organizational accountability rested on the shoulders of the principals.
Their main response was to increase control and to assemble a leadership team of
assistant administrators, instructional specialists, test coordinators, and school
improvement resources teachers that were often hired through reconstitution-designated
funds. Externally constrained by districts' and states' programmatic and managerial
mandates and supports, the fate of probation, internally, was largely decided by the
interplay between the principals' leadership, the skills and commitments that the
specialists brought to their task, and a largely compliant, but relatively immobilized,
increasingly inexperienced, and uncommitted staff.
School B was the moving middle school in the sample. According to staff comments, the
RE designation made their principal into a more vigilant manager, overriding the 
traditional hands-off style with which administrators and staff had traditionally
accommodated each other at the school. The principal abolished all faculty and team
meetings and called House teams into his office once a week. During these meetings,
faculty members were informed and admonished to comply with the principal's
expectations and the strategies adopted by the instructional specialists. The faculty's role
was to report on task completion. The principal began to visit classrooms regularly with
checklists in hand. On his visits, he emphasized behavior modification strategies that
could be monitored easily, such as the daily lesson plan, a fixed surface structure of the
lesson, seating arrangements, bulletin board displays, the placement of the district
curriculum on the teacher's desk, the page opened to the day's curriculum, etc., all of 
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which staged the teachers' compliance with school improvement efforts. In addition, the
very skillful instructional specialist had compiled a handbook of generic strategies that
she believed would "crack" the complexity of the performance-based test, such as a
particular surface structure for essays, a particular way of writing out a math problem,
etc. During weekly campaigns, teachers were expected to practice these strategies with
their students and were monitored on their use. The school raised its test scores
substantially for one year, but was unable to keep up this upward trend.
Control at School B came with a smiling face. The principal was warm and paternal, but
had made it clear that they, he with the rest of the school, had their backs against the 
wall. The instructional specialist was accommodating and always full of ideas, but the
teachers knew that her proposals were what the principal wanted to get done. Teachers at
School B felt controlled and supported. Many of our interviewees empathized with the
principal's difficult position (it somehow reflected their own), they "understood" that
accountability dictated stronger measures, and they appreciated the sense of direction
that was provided for them, but at the same time many wished to escape the pettiness
and pressure and work somewhere else. After the first year of probation, and despite the
school's success, 70 percent of the teachers were contemplating to leave the school, and
turn-over rates remained stubbornly high.
School C, the "moving elementary school" responded similarly to probation. But here 
the principal relied more on his team for results. One of the instructional specialists
managed to develop detailed knowledge of the school's test score data and designed a
daily curriculum for all lower-grade teachers. Many appreciated the support, and some
were "encouraged" to teach these lessons by the principal's unannounced visits.
However, although the school managed to improve as evidenced by raising test scores
substantially in two consecutive years and the district alleviated severely overcrowded
conditions, teacher turn over hardly abated. Out of 30 classroom teachers in 1997/98,
only eight could still be found in the school at the beginning of the 2000/2001 school
year; of those eight, four were kindergarten teachers. The principal had announced his
retirement and the instructional specialist her leaving.
A third school, a middle school located in the same district, was also moving, but it
moved astray into "pathological rigidity" as we termed it. With a legacy of discipline 
problems, the district installed a new principal with a proven track record of school
improvement who brought with her a loyal leadership team and cleaned house. Her
hallmark were a tight hall supervision policy and the same control mechanisms in use in
the other two schools, minus the attention to curriculum and instruction. Debate was not
tolerated at faculty meetings, and teachers' rule infractions were publicly rebuked and
justified with the need for accountability, occasionally over the PA system. Test scores
never improved much or declined, and year after year fifty percent or more of the faculty
left. In the end the leadership team imploded and the remaining teachers threatened a
walk-out.
In the two "stuck" schools, probation was an altogether less dramatic affair at the time of
the study. Located in a district where support for probation schools had to be spread over 
half of the district's schools, Schools D and E had been designated for three years at the
time of the study and probation had become habituated. If School D, a large middle
school, had ever shown a more spirited response to probation, there was no trace of that
during the time of our field work. MSPAP test scores had remained very low and
stagnant for the entire probation period, and for teachers the signal of probation was
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simply submerged among the many other concerns for daily order and survival. When
we first entered School D, we encountered a dispirited principal who felt he had barely
made a dent in his school during his one year tenure. Frustrated by flat test scores,
district inaction on the most basic building repairs, and feuding with the faculty, he was
counting his days to be replaced. The next principal showed very little urgency and
concern for change. He said that he would study the school the first year and then take 
his steps. He was liked, but he was also known to take his breaks with other teachers
smoking under a tree off school grounds. His tenure ended with an acrimonious faculty
meeting during which some faculty members aired their raw frustrations with his
inaction.
School E, a small elementary school located in a very poor section of town, had actually
been moving at some time. When the school was "named" as one of the first in the state, 
the school and community had organized a spirited rally in support of the school and in
protest against the state. The principal, rooted in the community, had a background in
staff development, but management was not her strong suit, so she opted for intensive
training of her staff in performance-based pedagogy. Test scores improved remarkably
and with increasing numbers of schools entering probation, she was in high demand as a
speaker and trainer. But her training-based improvement model faded as the district
spread staff development resources thinner with increasing numbers of probation
schools, and as high teacher turn-over erased past training gains. The school was unable
to fill positions, and it became common that teachers quit mid-year. While on probation,
the percentage of inexperienced teachers increased to 70 percent. One year, with test
scores plummeting, the school could not fill positions with permanent teachers in 3rd
grade, a key testing grade for MSPAP. Also, while on probation, the percentage of
special education students increased from 23 percent, already above the district average, 
to 27 percent. All instructional specialists had to be moved into regular instruction, and
as a result the faculty according to one of the specialists did not even have sufficient
basic capacity to implement the district-mandatory and very prescriptive "Open Court"
literacy program even with district training. With test scores decreasing and the faculty
dispirited and worn-out, the district decided to replace the principal who hitherto had
provided a modicum of stability, with a new, but inexperienced principal. The school
declined even further, and after six months into the tenure of the new principal, the state
announced that the school would be taken over by the state the following year. That
year, prior to the actual take-over, satisfactory scores on the MSPAP plummeted to zero
or near zero.
Summary from the Maryland Cases
Rather than staging crisis and opening channels of inquiry into solutions with broad
faculty participation, administrators are in crisis and as conduits of accountability tend to 
mute the voices of outspoken critics who might question the undisputed reality and
legitimacy of the accountability system, but whose ardor might also expose the school to
honest self-evaluation. Accountability is accepted as a fact; the value and realism of
performance goals is not publicly deliberated in most schools. The teachers are willing
to rally around their leader as long as they sense tangible progress. Teachers resist crude
managerial control, but accept increased control in those schools where it is laced with
traditional paternalism and concrete assistance. Teacher learning takes place as skill
(re)training primarily. 
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High principal turnover or low-impact principals doom a school's probationary period.
Our "success" cases have higher (perceived) capacity. They are more unified and 
supportive, their faculty is perceived as more skillful, capacity building is seen as more
effective, and the district is more forthcoming with new resources and interventions. But
also, probation makes teachers compliant, and traditional prerogatives of teachers'
classroom autonomy are overcome through administrative power attached to specialists'
instructional support. In the more successful cases, increased rigidity is associated with
more effectiveness of the organization. Discipline tightens; more attention is paid to the
state assessments; classroom teachers are on guard. Career teachers and instructional
specialists are roused into action and rally around the principal. A curriculum is being
followed. Increased participation in staff development workshops may have increased
the competence of (especially novice) teachers. Some of the seven schools post modest
improvements in this way. But increased organizational rigidity exerts a price. Teachers
are dissatisfied; some resent the pressure and standardization, and many contemplate
leaving. These are not circumstances under which internal accountability flourishes.
Improvement strategies chosen by the schools correspond to the patterns of leadership. 
Schools rely on external programs, sweeping standardization, easily surveillable
behavior, surface compliance reviews, and test preparation schemes (see also Mintrop &
MacLellan, 2002, for results of the content analysis of school improvement plans).
Evidence from the Kentucky Cases - Rethinking the Pattern
On the individual level, notwithstanding different weights, basic patterns were similar in
schools from both states. But on the organizational level, we did not observe the same 
kind of organizational rigidity pattern in the four Kentucky schools that were so
prevalent in the Maryland schools. To begin with, probation in the Kentucky schools
was an altogether less stirring affair. (This is 1998 when the first wave of accountability
demands is spent and the system is in the throes of political contestation.) Teachers and
administrators stressed continuity of their school's efforts to improve regardless of the
school's status. The Kentucky respondents attached less importance to higher test scores
and less meaning to the accountability system. Performance problems tended to be
externalized. One school considered itself the "district dumping ground," another the
district "special ed magnet." Although public stigma hurt and instilled in most teachers a
desire to shed the "in decline" label, they reported to a lesser degree than Maryland
teachers having exerted more effort as a result of probation. 
Although, compared to Maryland responses, Kentucky respondents were less optimistic 
about their school's prospects of improvement and less certain about their efficacy with
their students despite higher levels of work experience, they gave their schools higher
marks on capacity. Faculties were seen as more skillful and collegial and principals as
more supportive and less controlling. Principals themselves did not feel threatened in
their jobs based on test scores. Three of the four principals owed their long tenure to
districts that the state accountability system largely by-passed, and district interventions
were not as prominent. Hence the urgency that fueled control strategies in the Maryland
schools was largely absent. Teachers felt challenged to do a better job at aligning their
curriculum with the increasingly prescriptive state core curriculum and pay more
attention to test-specific features, such as writing prompts. Because the faculties were
fairly stable, there was more evidence of training effects in the interviews. The
Distinguished/ Highly Skilled Educators provided assistance in assessment-specific 
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features and were seen as helpful in keeping their schools focused on what schools could
internally control (Mintrop, MacLellan, & Quintero, 2001). But they did not direct the
schools' improvement strategies. Rather their formal authority position was absorbed
into the traditional hierarchy of the schools. More managerial autonomy of the school
fostered entrepreneurialism in attracting new grants and projects. "You name it, we've
tried it," as one principal termed it, was the visible badge of the schools' commitment to
improvement. Several HSE's bemoaned that this approach left (low) expectations and
classroom routines in these schools largely unexamined.
In summary, then, the detected rigidity effects of probation in the Maryland case may not 
be a general pattern of response to probation, but be related to a specific constellation of
factors: More district control, threatened principals, and ordinary teachers with low
skills, low commitment, and modest work motivation all working within a state
accountability system that steers local districts with pedagogically complex outcome
demands without providing the tools to reach them. Thus, one might say that the
Maryland schools are a case of high administrative pressure meeting low capacity. In the
four Kentucky schools, we observe a more traditional pattern of school improvement
through alignment and the acceleration of add-ons. The eleven schools have in common,
however, the absence of dialog about teachers' responsibility and the school's
expectations, and a conversation about a meaningful response crafted in the tension
between the school's and the accountability system's shortcomings. 
Instructional Changes
Intuitions
Given the ambitious performance-based character of the accountability systems studied
here, schools, in order to master probation successfully, not only need to compel 
students to work harder, but also learn differently. Higher work intensity, tighter lesson
plans, but also higher order thinking and teamwork are paramount. When teachers have
the will to change and faculties have begun to evaluate the shortcomings of their school,
raise their own expectations to the high demands of the system, and agree on formal
procedures of internal accountability, the conditions are ripe for a restructuring of
teaching content and methods. 
Theories
The literature on curriculum policy and instructional change shows that what teachers 
learn from policy depends on a host of factors: their extant practices, their understanding
and interpretation of the policy, their own experiences, dispositions and skills, and the
support they receive in efforts to change their practices (Cohen, McLaughlin, & Talbert,
1993; Darling-Hammond, 1997; Grant, 1998) found that teachers responded quite
differently to the same reform, even when exposed to the same interventions. Spillane &
Jennings (1997) show that when districts employed alignment strategies to change
instructional practice at the level of classroom discourse, they often achieved superficial
task modification, but did not reach more deeply ingrained task and discourse structures.
Two responses are observed in the literature. Teachers often trivialize complex tasks to
simpler task demands (Cohen, 1990); Spillane & Jennings, 1997; see also Spillane &
Zeuli, 1999; Cohen & Ball, 2001) and they doubt the relevance of ambitious
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performance standards and institutional demands when incongruent with the perceived
needs of their students (Darling-Hammond & Wise, 1985). In this case, institutional 
demands and school reality come in conflict with each other unless high standards are
examined in light of real student work (McDonald, 1996). If teachers learn ambitious
pedagogy through "revisiting and reinventing" (Cohen & Ball, 1999), then probation
cannot succeed without accountability being connected to personal educational
meanings and processes of organizational dialog and learning that facilitate exploring
these meanings.
Findings
It is apparent from the previous sections on individual learning and organizational 
development that probation in the context of the eleven schools provided unfavorable
conditions for learning new and ambitious performance-based pedagogy. For many
teachers, the state assessments did not provide meaningful tools for the self-evaluation
of their teaching. Teachers were not data-driven. Rather data from the state assessments
tended to be discounted in their value and validity. On the organizational level,
probation fostered rigidity and compliance with external obligations, as in the case of the
Maryland schools, to the detriment of organizational learning and internal dialog.
Moreover, whereas the accountability system calls for an upgrading of teaching quality,
the investigated schools on probation struggled with high teacher turnover, low job
commitment, an increasing number of uncertified and inexperienced teachers, and in 
some cases highly unsupportive districts.
We saw that large numbers of teachers in the 11 schools viewed themselves as highly
competent professionals whose skills and knowledge measured up to the demands of the 
states' performance-based assessments. But in reality, 70 to 80 percent of the observed
lessons in Maryland did not show evidence of elaborate level teaching at all; that is, the
frequency of higher-order thinking, problem solving, and complex dialog among the
counted snapshots (total number 150) was very low. (Due to their limited number, we
did not quantify the observed lessons in Kentucky.)Only one third of all observed
Maryland lessons were deemed highly coherent, i.e. beginning, middle, and end hung
together; the majority lacked conceptual depth. On the positive side, in the
overwhelming majority of lessons, teachers used a variety of materials, activities, and
forms of interaction; in quite a few lessons variety was a very prevalent feature. Contrary
to some other assessment systems that emphasize minimum competency tested in a
multiple-choice format (Darling-Hammond, 1991; Noble & Smith, 1994), evidence of
practicing simple test taking skills (i.e. "drill and kill") was fairly low. In all likelihood, 
the complexity of the state assessments in the two states did not lend itself to such an
approach.
A selection of seven teachers illustrates patterns observed across the 30 classrooms. We
observed the classroom of a senior middle school teacher who had the reputation as an 
innovator. In the observed lesson, she had students measure the relationship between
diameter and circumference of various circular objects. By following the lesson "script"
from the newly adopted mathematics textbook, she believed that her instruction was
aligned with MSPAP because "they match the skills with the national standards. So it is
really close because I know the MSPAP is taken from the state standards that they get
from the national standards" (G-16).
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The problem was that, contrary to the intentions of the book, she herself introduced Pi
without the students having had a chance to discover the relationship themselves. She
said, "I'm a math teacher. I'm used to, you know, this is this and this is this…" To her,
the ability to work successfully in groups was the key to MSPAP proficiency,
construction of concepts was the lesser of her concerns. But despite her willingness to
change, accountability for her was "treating you more like a child… So, I see it as the
work doubling….And we do it, I mean, you know, they say "this" and we do it. [But] the
morale doesn't work very well. (G-16)
A young and effective mathematics teacher in another middle school coped with
accountability differently. Because of the variety of testing situations she had to prepare
her students for, she parsed her lessons in a regular pattern of basic skills,
performance-based, and regular lessons: "If it's just a regular lesson, no MSPAP, no
Functional per se, then I rely on the book" (B-17). She was obviously a skilled
classroom manager and adept at teaching. When asked how she envisioned closing the
gap between her students' capacities and the state's expectations, she responded: "Well,
one day at a time, basically. I knowthat the gap cannot be tightened within a, you know,
short period of time… and in time, if instruction is, if you're doing what you're supposed
to do, then the scores will come up" (B-17)
We visited the classroom of a very respected science teacher with the reputation of a
disciplinarian. He taught a very directive and repetitive lesson. Changing his teaching in
response to the accountability system was out of the question for him. He taught the 
content he believed needed teaching, with the materials of his choice (very old
textbooks), in the manner that he saw fit. An alternation of very directed reading with
experiential lessons worked best for him. Similarly, his colleague, a middle-aged
woman, highly respected by students, taught a very traditional lesson that kept students
working hard. She introduced herself: "I don't know if you want this on tape but I have a
sticker on my car that says, 'Stop MSPAP, teach basics.'" She subverted external
pressures and was outspoken about her conviction that she had better sense than the
various distant agencies and actors that tried to tell her what worked with her students:
No matter what happens, I don't change, and they [the students] depend on 
it. That's important to them. It's also a part of classroom climate. My
expectations don't change for them. They know what to expect. (A-22)
An elementary school teacher, in contrast, was delighted with the instructional materials
mandated by the school. She loved the scripted nature of the Open Court reading. She 
was confident that if students could read they would be successful at taking the MSPAP
test when the time came, or any other test for that matter.
Mr. C. faced the problems that many beginning teachers face. We observed a frustrating
lesson during which he attempted to teach the difference between "action and state of 
being verbs." He received little instructional support or guidance. Student discipline was
not, in his view, an administrative priority at his school and that combined with parental
non-involvement made classroom management very difficult for him. He faulted his
inability to raise his instruction to grade level on his students' lack of knowledge. Mr. C.
assured us that "I can be rather creative when I'm in the right environment." When asked
whether the reconstitution eligibility status of the school or the MSPAP influenced his
teaching, he replied, "Is MSPAP driving what we're doing in any way? No. No. What's
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driving what we're doing is survival" (G-21). Another beginning teacher, Mr. S., was in
the same situation. Nonetheless, he made an effort to follow the adopted curriculum as
closely as possible, but was often thrown for a loop, as in the observed lesson, because
the curriculum did not match up with his students' below-grade-level skills. He did not
think that students could come up to the expected performance level because his third
grade students were "already so far behind" (F-20). Mr. S. was, in his words, "worn out"
and "run down" by trying to reconcile the reality that "a lot of things that the kids come
into school with are things that are way beyond my control" and being held accountable
for student achievement. He intended to leave teaching at the end of the school year.
Most teachers we visited considered it unlikely that their students would reach the lofty
goals the accountability had set out for them. But teachers were willing to try 
concentrating on incremental learning steps. In negotiating the gap between external
performance demands and the perceived abilities of their students, teachers foremost
gauged their lessons to students: "I teach to the needs of the students. That's what I feel I
should do because if I try to teach up here and they're not up there, I'm wasting my time
and my energy because they will never meet with success" (F-17; second grade).
Teachers felt justified teaching lessons in a basic skills format that traditionally
"worked" for "their kids." In the view of many, MSPAP activities distinguished
themselves mainly as writing activities, group work, and the use of particular analytic
vocabulary. For fewer teachers, reflection on one's own thought process was also
associated with MSPAP. This pattern holds across all observed teachers. Often the
conceptual depth of knowledge construction that is a core element of the new pedagogy
was simplified into a set of activity formats. Judging from the debriefing interviews that
accompanied lesson observations, teachers were, for the most part, not aware of this task
trivialization. This was not surprising, considering that the test itself was shrouded in
mystery and teachers only reluctantly discussed items that they had seen for fear of doing
something inappropriate. Thus, while teachers on one hand did not reach the levels of
pedagogical complexity that the state assessments envisioned, test practice was not
trivialized to the level of learning how to "fill in the bubbles" either. The more
performance-based assessments, in place in Maryland and Kentucky at the time of the
study, may have discouraged this.
Although teachers strongly expressed the notion that their lessons were first and 
foremost adapted to their students' ability and achievement levels, tests, new
instructional programs, new curricula, and new textbooks reached deeply into many
teachers' classrooms. But external pressures and directions were multiple and often
contradictory. In the survey, more than half of the teachers felt clearly directed by the
accountability system. Observations show this clarity much more laden with conflict.
For all their resentment, many teachers, almost in passing, expressed habitual
compliance with administrative mandates intended to align instruction with MSPAP.
Although they saw the accountability system as unhelpful and stacked against them, they
did not reject it and did not outright condemn it. They truly served two masters. They
wanted to concurrently accept the institutional weight of the state and be sensitive to the
needs of their students, but the two pulled from opposite ends. Some teachers learned
from this tension, but more frequently tension was diffused by discarding the state's
directives by virtue of their unreasonableness, or by discarding students as uneducable.
But the great majority adopted officially sanctioned programs as a defensive retreat that
relieved them of dissonance and delegated the decisions and responsibilities to a higher
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level. In all the schools, a main feature of instructional reform was the monitoring of
surveillable behavior. A few teachers considered this "good pressure" (F-18), but many
experienced teachers thought it failed to attack the real problems faced by the school, 
like this senior teacher:
We are now held to certain standards and expectations such as we have
expectations for the students, the principal has some and administration has
expectations for us and she checks to make sure that these things are being
done….In the past we've more or less been left to do to our own task and
like I used to be guilty of not writing lesson plans. I'd come in, I knew what
I wanted to teach….Really, the only thing I do differently now is write
out…..But other than that, there's nothing I didn't do that I've changed. I still
have my objectives, my outcomes, my warm-ups….That was all there
before. (A-24)
Instructional Change in the Four Kentucky Schools
Descriptions of Kentucky classrooms are based on a smaller base of observations.
Therefore Kentucky patterns are more anecdotal. None of the Kentucky teachers we 
visited in their classrooms reported instructional sea changes as a result of the state
assessments. Most teachers described their instructional changes as "add[ing] skills here
and there" (10-10, second grade math). Patterns of instruction in the small number of
classrooms we visited in the Kentucky schools were very similar to the patterns
encountered in the Maryland schools. Most lessons were taught on a basic level, some
lessons were marginal. 
Changes mentioned by teachers bifurcated. There were those that had to do with
alignment. Overall Kentucky interviewees seemed relatively well informed about unique 
features of the system, most notably portfolios and writing prompts. Conceivably, with
less staff fluctuation, professional development and assessment-related training may
have left their mark to a much larger degree than in the Maryland schools. Highly
Skilled Educators cautiously focused schools on key tasks of the reform, such as
planning, portfolios, writing, and curriculum alignment. Most teachers said they tried to
cover the core curriculum as best they could:
Well, each school does an aligned curriculum, so that's what I'm supposed
to teach. That's my aspect of it….What we try to do is make sure that we
have given them a thorough review for the test. We try to get as much
through as possible. With the test, they give you roughly what percentages,
like 10 percent is going to be weather and stuff like that, so you say, "Well,
okay, it's going to be 10 percent weather, so I can give them worksheets on
weather and give them a project on weather." Things like that….(40-15,
sixth grade science)
But on the other hand, Kentucky schools had wide discretion in selecting programs and
strategies. For some teachers, instructional goals were to raise achievement on state 
assessments while many others revealed that the need to motivate students was a more
persuasive influence on their decision making about instructional materials. Pressures
from the school's accountability status did not seem to foreclose their own approaches
and curriculum alignment left flexibility. Overall, being "in decline" did not exert a
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strong press towards broader instructional changes. One teachers weighted the effect of
the "in decline" status this way:
Yes and no. Yes because there are certain things that I must do to... They
have requirements now for us, like we have to do so many questions with
the kids, like open response questions and things like that, so yes, it affects
me in that way. The curriculum is not changed any. The curriculum is the
same. If they were not here, if I'm doing my job, then I'd still be doing the
same curriculum. Channel 11 was in here and they asked the same question.
They said, "What are you doing...blah blah blah?" And I said, "Well, the
academics are still the same. It's just our accountability that's up for grabs
right now." We have to show that we're doing these things by performing,
jumping through certain hoops. But no, I don't think I'm a better teacher
because I'm in decline trying harder…..I don't think I am doing anything
different. I do post stuff, though, because I'm supposed to. …..I didn't have
all the nice little things that they give us, so now I can label everything I
do…. We have to succeed on a test that the students take. …..The students
will take the test, but their grades are going to have to be high enough that
we succeed. (40-16)
Neither in the Maryland nor in the Kentucky classrooms did we encounter much of the
mind-numbing test drill and practice that have been reported from accountability 
systems in which traditional basic skills tests have become high-stakes.
The Limits of Sanctions
Incentives and sanctions are the linchpin of a new generation of high-stakes
accountability policies. I have explored how schools in pedagogically complex 
accountability systems responded to the signal of probation. On the positive side, almost
all of the eleven schools were modestly energized by the label, at least at some point or
from time to time. Teachers in all schools reported that they increased work effort and
engagement in school improvement as a result of pressure and direction. Management in
some schools tightened up, educators paid closer attention to the state assessments,
support from instructional specialists intensified, and the adoption of new programs,
strategies, and projects accelerated. In this way, a number of schools were able to
remedy some inefficiencies and provide more structure to teachers than previously had
been there.
A look at MSPAP test scores across the seven schools from Maryland during the
post-probationary period suggests as much. While two schools have made notable 
strides on the MSPAP test in the areas of math and reading since becoming
"reconstitution-eligible," for the majority MSPAP performance in these key areas has
either seen a very modest increase or decline, but mostly stagnancy. Additionally,
schools have been plagued with year-to-year score fluctuations. But all seven schools
arrested decline in the first years after identification. In all these respects, our sample
resembles the overall patterns identified for all Maryland schools on probation in the
1996 and 1998 cohorts. We concluded from this analysis that probation may foremost be
a tool to arrest decline in persistently low-performing schools, but it may not produce
large gains. By remedying gross inefficiencies, many schools are able to "harvest the
low-hanging fruit," as one of my colleagues calls this stage, but they make few further 
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inroads into the territory of instruction.
Had the assessments been less complex and more basic skills oriented, probation may 
have "worked" better, that is, the pressure of the stigma combined with various control
strategies and program standardization I described earlier could have produced an
intensification of instruction based on already existing competencies and instructional
formats. But pressure is a double-edged sword. It may challenge people to increase work
effort, but also make them want to leave if they do not value the pressure as serving a
worthy purpose. Increasing pressure would have exacerbated the already immense
problem of job commitment in the studied schools. Moreover, teachers knew that they
did not face too much competition for work places that many outsiders viewed as
unattractive. Hence, as to sanctions, most teachers called the states' bluff. Principals,
however, standing in for the accountability of the organization, felt differently.
Probation was not working well as a tool for instructional reform. To begin with, 
majorities of teachers did not find the standards of the accountability systems
meaningful for their work as educators. Being "unfairly" branded as "deficient" by a
system that was seen as insensitive to the needs of their disadvantaged students, they in
turn based their own sense of worth on personal relationships in their close-up
environments. Rather than accepting criteria and judgments of the system, they felt
singled out as the ones who had to carry the "blame" for student learning and in turn
externalized the causes for underperformance. Probation did instill in schools the notion 
that "something" had to be done, but in none of the schools did probation trigger
elements of internal accountability, if this is to mean a process through which a faculty
formulates its own expectations in light of student needs and high demands of the
system, agrees upon formal structures that hold them to account, and focuses
improvement on identified key instructional deficiencies.
This kind of internalization process was neglected in the Kentucky schools, but 
forestalled in the Maryland schools. The rigidity pattern encountered in the latter is an
example of what happens when high performance demands and top-down pressure meet
low capacity schools. The result was a proliferation of control strategies that had the
potential to turn classrooms into the opposite of what performance-based pedagogy
intended. Being "in the fish bowl" most teachers tightened up traditional lesson
structures. Coverage and task completion reigned supreme and more group work and
writing assignments were added. Looked at through the perspective of the seven focal
schools, the Maryland case illustrates the limits of steering educational reform through
incentives and sanctions placed on outcomes without an instructional technology that 
facilitated the alignment of demanding outcomes with curricula and materials and
provided a bridge to student needs. The state also left capacity building largely in the
hands of local districts, with the result that external demands and pressures fell upon
wholly unprepared schools that reacted with rigidity, rather than learning. In the
Kentucky cases these responses were avoided. Here, by contrast, higher capacity schools
responded to a system that was less ambitious pedagogically, more prescriptive as to
alignment, and more supportive through the Highly Skilled Educator feature.
But there are success cases among the Maryland schools on probation. And one of the 
moving schools in our sample may give us an idea of what went into their improvement:
an experienced principal, exceptional instructional specialists with data analysis,
curriculum development, and coaching abilities, and additional resources provided by
the district. And yet, prospects for the school are dimmed. Leaders exit, and without a
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process that involves all faculty members as responsible and committed actors, rather
than mere implementers, the school may find itself at a loss again.
The accountability systems in both states operate on the assumption of organizational 
stability. Only this assumption makes it legitimate to publicly expose putative
deficiencies of whole schools based on year-to-year comparisons of schoolwide test
scores. The reality of the 11 schools on probation selected for the study is, however,
quite different. These schools were, on the whole, hard and challenging work
environments that educated large numbers of students considered at risk. Particularly the
7 Maryland schools faced instability due high teacher and administrator turn-over, and
increasing proportions of inexperienced teachers which first and foremost raises the
specter of student discipline problems and social instability. But the Kentucky schools as
well were beset with high student mobility rates and changing student in-take or
attendance zones, changes that were outside of their control. Under these conditions,
continuous improvement was an impossibility due to the schools' lack of organizational
continuity. Thus, many of the schools, particularly in Maryland, needed baseline 
stabilization first before they could embark on ambitious instructional reforms. The
responsible actors for this kind of stabilization are for the most part districts and states.
Teachers themselves give us an idea of what is urgently needed. When asked to select
among 10 priorities for school improvement, large majorities chose student discipline,
teacher motivation, and teacher turn-over while not even ten percent believed that a new
pedagogy should be first on the agenda.
Note: I would like to thank Daria Buese, Kim Curtis, Masako Nishio, Lea Plut-Pregelj, 
and Margaret Quintero for their assistance, as well an anonymous reviewer for very
insightful comments. This research was supported by a grant from the Office of
Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education (No.
R308F70035). The views expressed in this article are mine.
Notes
See the full report at www.gseis.ucla./faculty/mintrop, "Schools on Probation."1.
These were direct questions in the interviews and scales derived from 
questionnaire items. (See Technical Report for details at
www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/mintrop/).
2.
Since many reconstitution-eligible (RE) schools in Maryland (including the seven 
selected schools) improved only marginally or not at all after identification,
punitive transfers of principals were frequent. In four of the seven schools in our
selection, the RE designation was accompanied with an immediate change of the
principal. Two of the four new principals did not survive their first year after RE
designation, one was transferred after his second year. One school had a new
principal every year for the three years of data collection. In three schools, the
long-term principals survived the RE designation, but they felt highly uncertain in 
their tenure. One of them subsequently lost her job and chose early retirement,
leaving only two principals who survived RE designation in their assignments.
One of those two retained his job against the explicit wish of the state department
to remove him and one retired two years after his school's probation designation.
By comparison, across the four Kentucky schools, the situation was more stable.
Three of the four schools were headed by principals with long tenure in their 
schools. One school, by contrast, had a new principal every year in the last six
3.
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years, though this was not attributed to the school's performance status, but to
district problems.
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